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Scale developmenta b s t r a c t
Morality-as-Cooperation (MAC) is the theory that morality is a collection of biological and cultural solu-
tions to the problems of cooperation recurrent in human social life. MAC uses game theory to identify
distinct types of cooperation, and predicts that each will be considered morally relevant, and each will
give rise to a distinct moral domain. Here we test MAC’s predictions by developing a new self-report mea-
sure of morality, the Morality-as-Cooperation Questionnaire (MAC-Q), and comparing its psychometric
properties to those of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). Over four studies, the results support
the MAC-Q’s seven-factor model of morality, but not the MFQ’s five-factor model. Thus MAC emerges as
the best available compass with which to explore the moral landscape.
 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is anopenaccess article under theCCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction However, previous cooperative accounts of morality have notWhat is morality? What explains its content and structure? And
how is it best measured? In recent years, the study of morality has
become the focus of a thriving interdisciplinary endeavour, encom-
passing research not only in psychology, but also in evolutionary
theory, genetics, biology, animal behaviour, anthropology, neuro-
science and economics (Haidt, 2007; Shackelford & Hansen, 2016;
Sinnott-Armstrong, 2007). A common view in this body of work is
that the function of morality is to promote cooperation (Curry,
2016; Greene, 2015:40; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010:800; Rai & Fiske,
2011:59; Sterelny & Fraser, 2016:1; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013:231).1made full use of the mathematical analysis of cooperation – the
theory of nonzerosum games – to provide a systematic taxonomy
of cooperation. They have instead tended to focus on a relatively
narrow range of cooperative behaviours (typically kin altruism
and reciprocal altruism), and omitted others (for example, coordi-
nation and conflict resolution) (Table 4 in Curry, 2016). Thus, pre-
vious accounts have attempted to explain morality from an
unnecessarily restricted base, and missed the opportunity to fur-
nish a broader, more general theory of morality.
The present paper has two goals. First, we use nonzerosum
game theory to provide the rigorous, systematic foundation that
the cooperative approach to morality has previously lacked. We
show how this rich, principled explanatory framework – which
we call ‘Morality-as-Cooperation’ (MAC; Curry, 2016; Curry,
Mullins, &Whitehouse, 2019) – incorporates more types of cooper-
ation, and thus explains more types of morality, than previous
approaches. The current version of the theory incorporates seven
well-established types of cooperation: (1) the allocation of
resources to kin (Hamilton, 1963); (2) coordination to mutual
advantage (Lewis, 1969); (3) social exchange (Trivers, 1971); andResearch
oject no.
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ish and (5) dove-ish traits (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973); (6) divi-
sion (Skyrms, 1996); and (7) possession (Gintis, 2007).
Second, we test MAC’s prediction that each of these types of
cooperation will be considered morally relevant, and each will give
rise to a distinct moral domain, by developing a new self-report
measure of moral values – with facets dedicated to (1) family val-
ues, (2) group loyalty, (3) reciprocity, (4) bravery, (5) respect, (6)
fairness and (7) property rights – and examine its psychometric
properties.2. How cooperation explains morality
The theory of Morality-as-Cooperation (MAC) argues that
morality consists of a collection of biological and cultural solutions
to the problems of cooperation recurrent in human social life
(Curry, 2016). Below we review the general argument, before look-
ing at how specific types of cooperation explain corresponding
types of morality.
Life begins when molecules start making copies of themselves.
These ‘replicators’ are ‘selfish’ in the technical sense that they pro-
mote their own replication (Dawkins, 1976/2006). They can pro-
mote their replication at the expense of other replicators. These
competitive interactions have a winner and a loser; one’s gain is
another’s loss; they are zerosum games (Maynard Smith, 1982;
Von Neumann &Morgenstern, 1944). But replicators can also repli-
cate in concert with other replicators (Dawkins, 1998). These coop-
erative interactions can have two winners; they are win-
win situations; they are nonzerosum games. Natural selection
can favour genes for cooperation – that is, genes for
evolutionarily-stable phenotypic strategies designed to achieve
superior equilibria in nonzerosum interactions – and has done
throughout the history of life. Natural selection for genes that
employ cooperative strategies has driven several ‘major transi-
tions’ in the evolution of life on Earth, including the formation of
cells, chromosomes and multicellular organisms (Maynard Smith
& Szathmáry, 1995). Natural selection has also favoured genes for
cooperation between individuals, in a wide variety of species
(Dugatkin, 1997), including humans. Humans descend from a long
line of social primates; they have spent 50 million years living in
social groups (Shultz, Opie, & Atkinson, 2011), and two million
years making a living as intensely collaborative hunter-gatherers
(Tooby & DeVore, 1987). This has equipped humans with a range
of biological – including psychological – adaptations for coopera-
tion. These adaptations can be seen as natural selection’s ‘attempts’
to solve the problems of cooperation. More recently, improvisa-
tional intelligence and cultural transmission (Boyd, Richerson, &
Henrich, 2011; Pinker, 2010) have made it possible for humans
to attempt to improve upon natural selection’s solutions by invent-
ing evolutionarily-novel solutions – ‘tools and rules’ – for further
bolstering cooperation (Binmore, 1994a, 1994b; Hammerstein,
2003; Nagel, 1991; Popper, 1945). Together, these biological and
cultural mechanisms provide the motivation for social, cooperative
and altruistic behaviour; and they provide the criteria by which
individuals evaluate the behaviour of others. According to MAC,
it is precisely these solutions to problems of cooperation – this col-
lection of instincts, intuitions, inventions and institutions – that
constitute human morality (Curry, 2005, 2016).2
Which problems of cooperation do humans face? And how are
they solved? Evolutionary biology and game theory tell us that2 To be clear, there are many ways of promoting genetic survival and reproduction;
some involve interpersonal cooperation, some do not. MAC hypothesises that it is
only the (un)cooperative strategies that are considered (im)moral. Other non-
cooperative ways of promoting survival and reproduction – such as strategies for
choosing habitats or avoiding predators – are not.there is not just one problem of cooperation but many, with many
different functionally, and perhaps phenotypically, distinct solu-
tions (Lehmann & Keller, 2006; Nunn & Lewis, 2001; Robinson &
Goforth, 2005; Sachs, Mueller, Wilcox, & Bull, 2004). Our review
of this literature suggests that there are (at least) seven well-
established types of cooperation: (1) the allocation of resources
to kin; (2) coordination to mutual advantage; (3) social exchange;
and conflict resolution through contests featuring (4) hawkish dis-
plays of dominance and (5) dove-ish displays of submission; (6)
division of disputed resources; and (7) recognition of possession.
We briefly review each of these below, and we consider how each
type of cooperation provides an explanation for a corresponding
type of morality (Table 1).
2.1. Allocation of resources to kin (Family Values)
Genes that benefit replicas of themselves that reside in other
individuals – that is, genetic relatives – will be favoured by natural
selection if the cost of helping is outweighed by the benefit to the
recipient gene(s) (Dawkins, 1979; Hamilton, 1963). So, evolution-
ary theory leads us to expect that under some conditions organ-
isms will possess adaptations for detecting and delivering
benefits (or avoiding doing harm) to kin. This theory of kin selec-
tion explains many instances of altruism, in many species
(Gardner & West, 2014), including humans (Kurland & Gaulin,
2005; Lieberman, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2007). MAC predicts that
because strategies for kin altruism realise a mutual benefit, they
will be regarded as morally good. This theory can explain why car-
ing for offspring (Edel & Edel, 1959/1968; an ‘ethic of care’;
Gilligan, 1982), helping family members (Fukuyama, 1996;
Wong, 1984), and avoiding inbreeding (Lieberman, Tooby, &
Cosmides, 2003; Westermarck, 1994) have been widely regarded
as important components of morality.
2.2. Coordination to mutual advantage (Group Loyalty)
In game theory, situations in which individuals are uncertain
about how to behave in order to bring about a mutual benefit
are modelled as coordination problems (Lewis, 1969). Humans
and other animals use a variety of strategies – such as focal points,
traditions, leadership, signalling, badges of membership, and ‘the-
ory of mind’ – to solve these problems (Alvard, 2001; Boos, Kolbe,
Kappeler, & Ellwart, 2011; Curry & Jones Chesters, 2012;
McElreath, Boyd, & Richerson, 2003), and form stable coalitions
and alliances (Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014; Bissonnette et al.,
2015; Harcourt & de Waal, 1992). MAC predicts that because solu-
tions to coordination problems realise mutual benefits, they will be
regarded as morally good. This theory can explain why participat-
ing in collaborative endeavours (Royce, 1908), favouring your own
group (Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006; Gert, 2013), and
adopting local conventions (Gibbard, 1990a, 1990b) have been
widely regarded as important components of morality.
2.3. Social exchange (Reciprocity)
In game theory, social dilemmas – prisoners dilemmas, public
goods games, tragedies of the commons – arise when the fruits
of cooperation are vulnerable to ‘free riders’, who accept the bene-
fit of cooperation, without paying the cost (Ostrom & Walker,
2002). This problem can be overcome by a strategy of ‘conditional
cooperation’ or ‘reciprocal altruism’, such as tit-for-tat (Axelrod,
1984; Trivers, 1971). Evidence for conditional cooperation has
been found in numerous animal species (Carter, 2014), including
humans (Cosmides & Tooby, 2005; Henrich et al., 2005; Jaeggi &
Gurven, 2013). MAC predicts that because solutions to social
dilemmas realise mutual benefits, they will be regarded as morally
Table 1
Overview of morality-as-cooperation.
Label Problem/Opportunity Solution Virtues Vices Epithet
1 Family Kin selection Kin Altruism Duty of care, special obligations to kin Incest, neglect Blood is thicker than water
2 Group Coordination Mutualism Loyalty, unity, solidarity, conformity Betrayal, treason United we stand, divided we fall
3 Reciprocity Social Dilemma Reciprocal Altruism Reciprocity, trustworthiness, forgiveness Cheating, ingratitude One good turn deserves another
4 Heroism Conflict Resolution (Contest) Hawkish Displays Bravery, fortitude, largesse Cowardice, miserliness With great power comes great responsibility
5 Deference Conflict Resolution (Contest) Dove-ish Displays Respect, obedience, humility Disrespect, hubris Blessed are the meek
6 Fairness Conflict Resolution (Bargaining) Division Fairness, impartiality, equality Unfairness, favouritism Let’s meet in the middle
7 Property Conflict Resolution (Possession) Ownership Respect for property, property rights Theft, trespass Possession in nine-tenths of the law
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Neusner, 2009; Confucius, 1994), as well as its various subcompo-
nents – trust (Baier, 1995), patience (Curry, Price, & Price, 2008),
gratitude (Emmons, 2004), guilt (Gibbard, 1990b), apology
(Ohtsubo & Watanabe, 2009), and forgiveness (Downie, 1965;
Godfray, 1992; Richards, 1988) – have been widely regarded as
important components of morality.
2.4. Contests between Hawks (Heroism) & 2.5 Doves (Deference)
Conflict over resources – food, territory, and mates
(Huntingford & Turner, 1987) – presents organisms with an oppor-
tunity to cooperate by competing in less mutually-destructive
ways (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973). There are three ways of
achieving this: contests (featuring the display of hawkish and
dove-ish traits), division, and possession.
Game theory has shown that conflicts can be settled through
‘contests’, in which individuals display reliable indicators of their
‘fighting ability’, and the weaker ‘contestant’ defers to the stronger
(Gintis, Smith, & Bowles, 2001; Maynard Smith & Price, 1973). Such
contests are widespread in nature (Hardy & Briffa, 2013; Riechert,
1998), and often form the basis of dominance hierarchies where
resources are allocated by ‘rank’ (Preuschoft & van Schaik, 2000).
Humans have a similar repertoire of status-related behaviours
(Fiddick, Cummins, Janicki, Lee, & Erlich, 2013; Mazur, 2005; Sell,
Tooby, & Cosmides, 2009), and culturally elaborated hierarchies
(Boone, 1992; Rubin, 2000).MACpredicts that because hawkish dis-
plays of dominance, and dove-ish displays of submission, together
realise mutual benefits, they will be regarded as morally good. This
theory can explain why these two apparently contradictory sets of
traits (Berlin, 1997) – the ‘heroic virtues’ of fortitude, bravery, skill,
andwit, and the ‘monkish virtues’ of humility, deference, obedience,
and respect – have been widely regarded as important components
of morality (Curry, 2007; MacIntyre, 1981a, 1981b).
2.6. Division (Fairness)
When the contested resource is divisible, game theory models
the situation as a ‘bargaining problem’ (Nash, 1950). Here, one
solution is to divide the resource in proportion to the relative (bar-
gaining) power of the protagonists (Skyrms, 1996). In the case of
equally powerful individuals, this results in equal shares
(Maynard Smith, 1982). Evidence for a ‘sense of fairness’ comes
from non-human primates’ adverse reactions to unequal treatment
in economic games (Brosnan, 2013; Brosnan & de Waal, 2014).
With regard to humans, rules such as ‘‘I cut, you choose”, ‘‘meet
in the middle”, ‘‘split the difference”, and ‘‘take turns”, are ancient
and widespread means of resolving disputes (Brams & Taylor,
1996). And ‘equal shares’ is a spontaneous and cross-culturally
prevalent decision rule in economic games (Henrich et al., 2005)
and similar situations (Messick, 1993). MAC predicts that because
dividing resources avoids a costly fight, and therefore realises a
mutual benefit, it will be regarded as morally good. This theorycan explain why fairness (Rawls, 1958) and willingness to compro-
mise (Pennock & Chapman, 1979) have been widely regarded as
important components of morality.
2.7. Possession (Property Rights)
Finally, game theory shows that conflicts over resources can be
resolved by deference to prior possession (Gintis, 2007; Hare,
Reeve, & Blossey, 2016; Maynard Smith, 1982). The recognition of
prior possession is widespread in nature (Sherratt & Mesterton-
Gibbons, 2015; Strassmann & Queller, 2014). Humans also defer
to prior possession in vignette studies (DeScioli & Karpoff, 2015;
Friedman & Neary, 2008), experimental games (the ‘endowment
effect’; Kahneman& Tversky, 1979), the law (Rose, 1985), and inter-
national relations (Johnson & Toft, 2014). Private property, in some
form or other, appears to be a cross-cultural universal (Herskovits,
1952). MAC predicts that because deferring to prior possession
avoids a costly fight, and therefore realises a mutual benefit, it will
be regarded as morally good. This theory can explain why the right
to own property and the prohibition of theft (Becker, 1977; Locke,
2000; Pennock & Chapman, 1980) have been widely regarded as
an important components of morality.
3. Summary and predictions
Morality-as-Cooperation (MAC) is the theory that morality con-
sists of a collection of biological and cultural solutions to the prob-
lems of cooperation recurrent in human social life. MAC draws
upon the mathematics of cooperation to identify and distinguish
betweendifferent types of cooperation, and therebyexplaindifferent
facets of morality. The present review has identified seven types of
cooperation, and hence seven candidate moral domains: obligations
to family, group loyalty, reciprocity, bravery, respect, fairness, and
property rights. ThusMAC can explain why specific forms of cooper-
ative behaviour – helping kin, helping one’s group, reciprocating
costs and benefits, displaying ‘hawkish’ and dove-ish traits, dividing
disputed resources, and respectingprior possession– are regarded as
morally good, and why the corresponding forms of uncooperative
behaviour – neglecting kin, betraying one’s group, free-riding, cow-
ardice, disrespect, unfairness and theft – are regarded asmorally bad.
Starting from these first principles, MAC makes the following
predictions about morality. First, with regard to content, MAC pre-
dicts that people will regard each type of cooperation as morally
relevant; that is, as falling within the moral domain. Second, with
regard to structure, MAC predicts that because the incidence and
value of these different types of cooperation vary independently
in social life (and are perhaps subserved by different psychological
mechanisms) the strength of endorsement of each of the
corresponding types of morality will vary independently too. In
other words, each of these seven types of cooperation will give rise
to a distinct moral domain. Accordingly, the theory predicts that
moral values will exhibit a multifactorial structure, varying on
these seven dimensions. Moreover, as a corollary of this prediction
4 ‘‘Unity is the motive to care for and support the integrity of in-groups by avoiding
or eliminating threats of contamination and providing aid and protection based on
need or empathic compassion. Hierarchy is the motive to respect rank in social groups
where superiors are entitled to deference and respect but must also lead, guide,
direct, and protect subordinates. Equality is the motive for balanced, in-kind
reciprocity, equal treatment, equal say, and equal opportunity. Proportionality is
the motive for rewards and punishments to be proportionate to merit, benefits to be
calibrated to contributions, and judgments to be based on a utilitarian calculus of
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specific type of cooperation will not constitute a distinct moral
domain. These predictions about the content and structure of
morality distinguish MAC from previous evolutionary and cooper-
ative theories of morality.
3.0.1. Moral Foundations Theory
The most widely-used, and thus far most extensive, attempt to
map the moral domain is Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; Haidt &
Graham, 2007) operationalised in the Moral Foundations Question-
naire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2011). Like MAC, MFT takes a coopera-
tive approach to morality, and maintains that there are many
moral domains. But, unlike MAC, MFT does not derive its domains
from any underlying theory of cooperation (Haidt & Joseph, 2011),
and proposes only five: Care, Fairness, Ingroup, Authority and
Purity.3 Like MAC, MFT includes domains dedicated to group loyalty
(Ingroup), deference (Authority) and fairness (Fairness). But unlike
MAC, MFT does not include domains dedicated to family, reciprocity,
heroism, or property. MFT has no foundation dedicated to kin altru-
ism; the MFQ does have two items pertaining to kin, but they appear
under Fairness and Ingroup. Nor has MFT any foundation dedicated
to reciprocal altruism: MFT places reciprocity (a solution to iterated
prisoners’ dilemmas) and fairness (a solution to bargaining prob-
lems) under the same heading, and the MFQ has no items pertaining
to reciprocity. MFT has no foundations, and the MFQ has no items,
dedicated to hawkish displays of dominance, such as bravery. And
the only mention of property occurs in an item about inheritance
under the foundation of Fairness.
MFT also includes domains – Care and Purity – that are not
related to a specific type of cooperation, and that MAC therefore
predicts will not constitute coherent domains.
MAC predicts that moral psychology will be sensitive to the
benefits (care, altruism) and costs (harms) of social interaction —
for what is cooperation but a particular configuration of benefits
and costs? But, as we have seen, MAC suggests that there are dif-
ferent types of benefits and costs — with different causes and con-
sequences. For example, some ‘harms’, such as murder, are
considered morally bad because they violate one or more cooper-
ative principles (they break implicit social contracts against the
use of force, and constitute an escalation of conflict, as opposed
to its peaceful resolution). Other ‘harms’, such as punishment or
self-defence, are considered morally good because they promote
cooperation. This perspective suggests that it is a mistake to
attempt to analyse benefits and costs in isolation, outside of their
cooperative context, by placing them in a separate, generic domain
dedicated to care or harm.
‘Purity’, meanwhile, has been described as the avoidance of
‘‘people with diseases, parasites [and] waste products” (Haidt &
Joseph, 2004). It has no explicated connection to cooperation; on
the contrary, it is regarded as an ‘‘odd corner” of morality precisely
because it is not ‘‘concerned with how we treat other people”
(Haidt & Joseph, 2004). By contrast, MAC suggests that the problem
of avoiding pathogens (and other disgust-eliciting stimuli) is not a
moral problem per se; instead, ‘pure’ or ‘impure’ behaviour is mor-
alised only when it provides benefits, or imposes costs on, others –3 Care/Harm is said to relate to ‘‘virtues such as kindness and compassion, and also
in corresponding vices such as cruelty and aggression”. Fairness/Reciprocity relates to
the virtues of ‘‘fairness and justice”, ‘‘individual rights and equality”. Ingroup/Loyalty
relates to ‘‘virtues such as loyalty, patriotism, and heroism” and vices such as betraya
and treason. Authority/Respect relates to ‘‘respect, awe, and admiration toward
legitimate authorities” and ‘‘virtues related to subordination: respect, duty, and
obedience”. And Purity/Sanctity relates to the virtues of being ‘‘chaste, spiritually
minded, pious” and the vices of "lust, gluttony, greed, and anger" (Haidt & Graham
2007).
costs and benefits.” (Rai & Fiske, 2011).
5l
,for example, by putting their health at risk. So, avoiding rotten fruit
on a tree is not a moral issue, but coughing in public without cov-
ering your mouth is. And, because there are many different ways in
which disgusting behaviour might influence others – the problem
of avoiding incest is not the same as the problem of avoiding peo-
ple with poor personal hygiene – MAC suggests that it is a mistake
to single out ‘purity’ as a separate, generic domain.
3.0.2. Relational Models Theory
Similarly, like MAC, Fiske’s Relational Models Theory (RMT)
takes a cooperative approach to morality, and maintains that there
are many moral domains. But, unlike MAC, RMT does not derive its
domains from any underlying theory of cooperation, and proposes
only four: Unity, Hierarchy, Equality and Proportionality (Fiske &
Rai, 2014; Rai & Fiske, 2011).4 Unlike MAC, RMT’s domain of Unity
does not distinguish between family and group; Hierarchy does not
distinguish between hawkish heroism and dove-ish deference; and
Equality and Proportionality do not distinguish between reciprocity
and fairness. Interestingly, like MAC, and unlike MFT, RMT argues
that there are no distinct domains dedicated to ‘harm’ or ‘purity’.5
3.0.3. Theory of Dyadic Morality
Unlike MAC (and MFT and RMT), Gray’s Theory of Dyadic Moral-
ity (TDM) (Schein & Gray, 2018) does not take a cooperative
approach to morality, but instead argues that the function of moral
rules is to minimise harm to others (and is therefore a form of util-
itarianism). TDM recognises that there may be different ‘‘genres” of
harm that correspond to MFT’s domains, but argues that all moral
violations are processed by general-purpose psychological mecha-
nisms, as opposed to distinct special-purpose mechanisms. Like
MAC, and RMT, TDM does not accept MFT’s claim that ‘purity’ is
a distinct domain of morality – indeed, TDM has marshalled con-
siderable evidence to suggest that ‘impure’ or disgusting acts are
merely a particular form of harmful behaviour (Gray, Schein, &
Ward, 2014).
3.0.4. Side-Taking Theory of Morality
Finally, like MAC, DeScioli and Kurzban’s ‘side-taking’ theory of
morality (STTM) agrees that cooperation explains moral
behaviour: ‘‘evolutionary theories of morality [that] focus on
understanding cooperation. . .do an excellent job of explaining
why humans. . .care for offspring, cooperate in groups, trade favors,
communicate honestly, and respect property” (DeScioli, 2016: 23).
However, whereas MAC would argue that these cooperative
theories also explain why people make and express moral‘‘[W]e must abandon the assumption that moral judgments are based on features
of actions independent of the social-relational contexts in which they occur (e.g., Did
the action cause harm?. . .Was the action impure?). Rather, we must reconceptualize
moral psychology as embedded in our social-relational cognition, such that moral
judgments and behaviors emerge out of the specific obligations and transgressions
entailed by particular types of social relationships (e.g., Did the action support us
against them? Did it go against orders from above? Did you respond in kind?).. . .[M]
oral intuitions are not based on asocial principles of right actions, such as prohibitions
against intentionally causing harm. . .or concerns with ‘purity’. . .Rather, moral
intuitions are defined by the particular types of social relationships in which they
occur.” (Rai & Fiske, 2011).
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future (Krasnow, Delton, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2016), to warn friends
and family of uncooperative individuals, to enhance one’s reputa-
tion as trustworthy or heroic (Barclay, 2016), or to recruit allies
to prosecute an offender (Petersen, 2013) – STTM argues instead
that the sole function of moral judgements is to provide salient
focal points around which people coordinate when taking sides
in interpersonal conflicts (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009, 2013). STTM
maintains that a wide range of content, including cooperative
rules, can fulfil this function.
Thus MAC makes predictions about the content and structure of
morality that are more extensive and detailed than those of previ-
ous theories. For the remainder of this paper we will focus on test-
ing MAC’s predictions against those of the most well-developed
theory – MFT – and return to the implications of our findings for
the other theories in the general discussion.
Previous empirical research provides some support for MAC’s
predictions about the content and structure of morality.3.1. The content of morality
With regard to content, an analysis of the historical ethno-
graphic records of 60 societies found that the moral valence of
these seven cooperative behaviours was uniformly positive, and
that there is evidence for the majority of these cooperative moral
values in the majority of cultures, in all regions of the world
(Curry et al., 2019). Research on more contemporary populations
paints a similar picture. First, a survey of family values involving
student samples from 30 countries (Byrne & van de Vijver, 2014;
Georgas, Berry, Van de Vijver, Kagitçibasi, & Poortinga, 2006) and
responses to items in the World Values Survey, conducted in over
65 societies (Inglehart & Baker, 2000), indicate that ‘helping kin’
is widely considered to be morally good. Second, responses from
internet samples to the Ingroup items in the Moral Foundations
Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011), and responses from student
samples in 20 countries to items from the Schwartz Basic Values
Survey (Schwartz, 1992) both indicate that ‘helping your group’ is
widely considered to be morally good. Third, endorsement of the
norms of positive and negative reciprocity in student samples
(Eisenberger, Lynch, Aselage, & Rohdieck, 2004), in Britain and
Italy (Perugini, Gallucci, Presaghi, & Ercolani, 2003), and
responses to some items in the Values in Action Inventory of
Strengths in 54 countries (Park, Peterson, & Seligman, 2006;
Peterson & Seligman, 2004) and Schwartz’s Values Scale
(Schwartz, 1992) indicate that ‘reciprocity’ is widely considered
to be morally good. Fourth, investigations into the concept of
honour, among students in the US and Turkey (Cross et al.,
2014) indicate that various hawkish traits such as bravery are
considered to be morally good. Fifth, responses to Authority
items in the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al.,
2011), and to items from the Schwartz Basic Values Survey
(Schwartz, 1992) indicate that ‘respecting superiors’ is widely
considered to be morally good. Sixth, responses to items in the
Merit Principle Scale in student samples (Davey, Bobocel, Son
Hing, & Zanna, 1999) indicate that ‘dividing disputed resources’
is considered to be morally good. And seventh, responses
to items in the World Values Survey (reported in Weeden &
Kurzban, 2013) indicate that ‘respecting property’ is widely con-
sidered to be morally good.
However, previous research has not provided a full test of
MAC’s predictions about the content of morality; no previous study
has investigated the moral relevance of all seven forms of cooper-
ative behaviour in a single, contemporary, representative sample.
Instead, the studies reviewed above have measured differentaspects of morality, in different ways; the scales they employ typ-
ically measure something other than the moral relevance (or
valence) of cooperation (for example, they ask whether a person
or a society possesses a particular trait, rather than whether the
trait is moral); and the samples they use are typically composed
only of students.3.2. The structure of morality
With regard to structure, no previous research has investigated
MAC’s prediction that these seven different types of cooperation
will give rise to distinct domains of morality. This is because no
previous attempts to map the moral domain – even those that have
argued that the function of morality is to promote cooperation –
have been guided by the mathematics of cooperation reviewed
above, and hence none contain all of the domains predicted by
MAC (Curry, 2016).
Nevertheless, despite its limitations, it is possible to ask
whether previous work using the Moral Foundations Question-
naire (MFQ) supports MAC’s predictions where the two theories
overlap. Here the evidence is mixed. Factor analysis has provided
only limited support for MFT’s five-factor model. The original
exploratory factor analysis of data collected using the MFQ sug-
gested a two-factor model (Table 2 in Graham et al., 2011). Con-
firmatory factor analysis of this data suggested that MFT’s five-
factor model provided a better fit; but the size of the improve-
ment was marginal, and more importantly, none of the resulting
five-factor models exhibited a conventionally ‘acceptable’ model
fit (CFIs  0.88; Table 10; Graham et al., 2011). Subsequent inde-
pendent replications in Italy (CFI = 0.88; Bobbio, Nencini, &
Sarrica, 2011), New Zealand (CFI = 0.83; Davies, Sibley, & Liu,
2014), Korea (CFI = 0.68; Glover et al., 2014), Sweden
(CFI = 0.68; Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015), and Turkey (CFI = 0.78;
Yilmaz, Harma, Bahcekapili, & Cesur, 2016), as well as a 27 coun-
try study using the short-form MFQ (CFIs  0.70; Iurino &
Saucier, submitted), all suggest a similar pattern. For this reason,
an alternative two-factor model – consisting of an ‘individualis-
ing’ domain of Care and Fairness, and the ‘binding’ domain of
Ingroup, Authority and Purity – is typically used in research
(for example, see: Lewis & Bates, 2010; Smith, Alford, Hibbing,
Martin, & Hatemi, 2016).
Thus empirical research with the MFQ does not support MAC’s
prediction that group, deference and fairness will be distinct
domains; but it does support MAC’s prediction that domains not
tied to specific forms of cooperation – namely Care and Purity –
will not constitute distinct domains.
However, it is not clear whether these findings indicate a prob-
lem with the cooperative approach to morality in general, or
merely a problem with the way that it has been operationalised
and measured in Moral Foundations Theory and the MFQ. After
all, proponents of MFT have acknowledged that the original list
of foundations was somewhat ‘‘arbitrary” (p. 107), based on a lim-
ited review of only ‘‘five books and articles” (p. 107); that this list
was never meant to be ‘‘exhaustive” (p. 104); and that they ‘‘do not
know how many moral foundations there really are” (p. 58). And
they have positively encouraged research that could ‘‘demonstrate
the existence of an additional foundation, or show that any of the
current five foundations should be merged or eliminated” (Graham
et al., 2013, p. 99).
And so, in order to test MAC’s predictions – that there
will be three additional domains (Family, Heroism, Property),
that Reciprocity should not be merged with Fairness; and
that Care and Purity should be eliminated – and to overcome
the limitations of MFT and the MFQ, we set out to develop a
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Questionnaire’.64. Study 1: Developing a Morality-as-Cooperation Questionnaire
(MAC-Q)
In order to test MAC’s predictions regarding the content and
structure of morality, we used the theories of cooperation
reviewed above to develop a self-report measure of moral attitudes
to seven types of cooperative behaviour (helping your family, help-
ing your group, reciprocating costs and benefits, being brave, defer-
ring to authority, dividing disputed resources, and respecting
property), used it to gather data from a large sample representative
of the UK adult population, and submitted the results to factor
analysis.4.1. Methods
In order to measure moral attitudes to the seven types of coop-
erative behaviour, we followed the MFQ in employing two scales,
addressing Relevance and Judgement, each of which is composed
of multiple three-item subscales reflecting each of the proposed
moral domains (MFQ; Graham et al., 2011).7
The Relevance scale was originally developed in order to test
whether, in addition to ‘liberal’ concerns such as care and fairness,
‘conservative’ concerns such as authority, group loyalty, and purity
are also considered relevant to morality (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek,
2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007). Here we use the scale to test
whether the types of cooperative behaviour envisaged by MAC
(especially the new domains of Family, Reciprocity, Heroism and
Property) are considered morally relevant, and also whether they
represent distinct domains. The Relevance scale asks participants
‘‘When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what
extent are the following considerations relevant to your think-
ing?”. Sample items from our version included ‘‘Whether or not
someone did what they had agreed to do”, and ”Whether or not
someone kept something that didn’t belong to them”. Participants
responded using an animated slider on a visual analogue scale
marked 0–100, and labelled from left-to-right ‘‘Not at all Relevant,
Not very relevant, Slightly relevant, Somewhat relevant, Very rele-
vant, Extremely relevant”.
The Judgement scale was originally developed in order to over-
come a perceived limitation of the Relevance scale, namely that it
might assess second-order views about how one makes moral
judgements, rather than the first-order moral judgements them-
selves. According toGrahamet al. (2009), relevance ‘‘does not neces-
sarilymeasure howpeople actuallymakemoral judgements”, hence6 OSC conceived of the study, secured funding, wrote the items, collected data,
contributed to preliminary analyses, and took the lead in writing the report. MJC
wrote the items, collected data, conducted preliminary analyses, and contributed to
writing the report. CJV conducted the main analyses, and contributed to writing the
report.
7 For Study 1, we aimed for a sample size of 10 cases per item (10 * 154), though
the procedures are reliably robust with > 1000 cases (MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, &
Hong, 1999). Similarly, for Study 2 we aimed for 10 cases per item (10 * 30). For Study
3a we aimed for 10 cases per free parameter (10 * 42). The resulting sample sizes
exceed requirements for three-indicator factors (Wolf, Harrington, Clark, & Miller,
2013). For Study 3b the sample size was determined by the number of participants
who accepted the invitation complete the follow-up. All materials used to generate
the data reported here are either in the public domain or else available on the Open
Science Framework page for this paper (osf.io/w5ad8). We have listed all the
materials used but not reported here. And all R and MPlus syntaxes required to
reproduce the reported results are also available on the OSF page. Regrettably, we are
unable to share the data, because the participant consent form included a form of
words that inadvertently precluded data sharing. We have now changed the wording
of our standard informed consent form to avoid this problem in future.Judgement items were introduced to provide ‘‘more contextualized
and concrete items that could more strongly trigger the sorts of
moral intuitions that are said to play an important role in moral
judgement”. Here we use the scale to provide an additional test of
whether the types of cooperative behaviour envisaged by MAC rep-
resent distinct domains. The Judgement scale asks participants ‘‘To
what extent do you agree with the following statements?”. Sample
items included ‘‘You should always put the interests of your family
first”, and ‘‘Courage in the face of adversity is the most admirable
trait”. Again, participants responded using an animated slider on a
0–100 visual analogue scale, whichwas labelled ‘‘Strongly Disagree,
Disagree, Neither, Agree, Strongly Agree”.
We generated items for the new MAC-Q scales based on a com-
prehensive review of the game-theoretic, evolutionary, psycholog-
ical, and philosophical literature on cooperation and morality
outlined above (Curry, 2005, 2016; Curry et al., 2019). We focussed
on the principal moral value in each of the seven hypothesised
domains of moral value. For example, for Hawkishness, we
focussed on heroism, as opposed to fortitude, generosity or wit.
And we aimed to produce items that could, in principle, be used
and understood by anyone at any time – the items focussed on
interpersonal relationships, and avoided any mention of modern
technology or governments. The two sets of items were pretested,
to identify heavily skewed or bimodal items. This resulted in 57
Moral Relevance items and 97 Moral Judgement items (available
at https://osf.io/w5ad8/).4.1.1. Participants & procedure
Participants were recruited via a market polling firm (PurePro-
file). An invitation email was sent to a sample of adults over
18 years-of-age living in the UK and being primary speakers of
English. The study was made available on the PureProfile website
from 3 to 14 September 2015.
Respondents were provided with information on the study aims
and methods. If they provided informed consent, participants were
directed to the study site. Participants were told that the goal of
the study was to investigate people’s sense of right and wrong –
described as ‘‘what people think of as morally good versus morally
bad; moral versus immoral; ethical versus unethical; praiseworthy
versus blameworthy”. They then completed versions of the Rele-
vance and Judgement scales. The two scales, and items therein,
were presented in randomised order. Participants then provided
basic demographic data (including age, sex, nationality). Partici-
pants could participate only once. Participation took around
12 min, for which participants were paid the equivalent of £0.5.
Responses collected via anonymous internet-based surveys
(such as this) depend on participants’ sustained effort and engage-
ment, and so are vulnerable to inattention and careless-
responding, which affect data quality and the integrity of results
(Meade & Craig, 2012). To detect careless responses we used a
direct, instructed question as an attention check (Desimone,
Harms, & Desimone, 2015).8 The attention-check item appeared
after the main MAC-Q and MFQ item sets, as careless responding
increases with survey length and participation time. We also applied
further quality controls to remove participants who: did not com-
plete the survey or did not provide demographic data; or who pro-
vided responses suggesting spoiled or inauthentic answers (for
example, always rating the items 0, 50 or 100, including those that
were reverse-coded).8 The text of the attention check was as follows: ‘‘Hobbies: Everyone has hobbies.
Nevertheless, we would like you to skip this question to show that you are reading
carefully. Just click ‘next’. Do not click any of the buttons corresponding to bike riding,
hiking, swimming, playing sports, reading or watching TV.”
10 All analyses were conducted in Mplus Version 7 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2012).
Per the developers’ recommendation, we used robust maximum-likelihood estima-
tion, which yields Satorra-Bentler scaled v2 values to account for potential non-
normality (Satorra, 2000). Model fit was evaluated using three absolute fit indices,
namely the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA, values < 0.01, 0.05 and
0.08 are considered to indicate excellent, good, and mediocre fit; MacCallum, Browne,
& Sugawara, 1996), Comparative Fit Index (CFI, acceptable fit > 0.9; Bentler & Bonett,
1980), and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR, good fit < 0.08; Hu &
Bentler, 1999).
11 In addition to measures of objective fit, we also provide three comparative fit
indices. First, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), second, sample-size adjusted
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2396 people initially accessed the survey. After removing inat-
tentive (544), incomplete (151), and spoiled (305) responses the
final sample consisted of 1392 UK working-age adults (628 males,
763 females, 1 transgender; age M = 47.14, SD = 11.14).
4.2.1. Selecting items for analysis
Our initial item pool contained an oversampling of items per
subscale. Accordingly, multicollinearity prevented analysis of the
entire pool of items, as indicated by the low determinant of the
correlation matrices for the Relevance (det = 4.80 * 1017) and
Judgement items (det = 1.45 * 1019). This suggests substantial
redundancy amongst the items. We therefore reduced the total
item pool to three items per subscale; the minimum required to
estimate latent variables (Kline, 2005). We retained those items
which most closely captured the essence of each domain, based
on theoretical consistency and empirical considerations – namely,
we examined the correlation of each item with the average of all
other items within its subscale, excluding the item itself (item-
total correlation without item). This resulted in a reduced item
pool of 21 items for Relevance and 21 for Judgement. The determi-
nant for Relevance still fell slightly below the threshold of 1 * 105
(det = 8.15 * 106), but no further problems were encountered dur-
ing analysis. The determinant for Judgement was acceptable
(det = 1.77 * 103). The full text of the final sets of Relevance and
Judgement items are given in Appendices A and B.
4.2.2. Content
Descriptives for the Relevance and Judgement items are given in
Tables S1 and S2. Descriptives for the seven Relevance and Judge-
ment subscales, are given in Table 2. Ratings for the Relevance
items and subscales ranged from ‘somewhat’ to ‘very’ relevant to
morality.
4.2.3. Structure
4.2.3.1. Internal consistency. Cronbach’s alphas for the seven sub-
scales (Table 2) ranged from 0.76 to 0.86 for Relevance, and 0.53
to 0.83 for Judgement.
4.2.3.2. Exploratory factor analysis. Given that the Relevance and
Judgement scales were developed to measure two aspects of moral
psychology thought to be different, we began by analysing each
separately, before attempting to combine them.
Although we had a priori hypotheses about the factor structure,
we first conducted exploratory factor analyses, on each scale, to see
whether the hypothesised structure emerged from the data. The
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin index indicated superb sampling adequacy
for Relevance (KMO = 0.95, individual items: 0.91–0.97), and mer-
itorious sampling adequacy for Judgement (KMO = 0.85, individual
items: 0.62–0.92). Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated that nei-
ther of the correlation matrices were identity matrices, moral Rel-
evance v2(210) = 16207.75, p < .001, and Judgement v2(210) =
8766.97, p < .001. The data are thus fit for factor analysis.
Parallel analysis (Horn, 1965) revealed that, for both the moral
Relevance and Judgement data, seven factors had eigenvalues
greater than those derived from randomly generated data.9 We
extracted these seven factors using factor analysis with ML estima-
tion and oblimin rotation to allow factors to correlate. For Relevance,
these factors explained 63% of variance in participants’ responses
(explained variance per factor 7.22–11.15%). For Judgement, these9 According to contemporary psychometric literature (Dinno, 2009), Horn’s (1965)
parallel analysis is the preferred method for determining the number of factors to
retain.factors explained 50% of variance in participants’ responses
(explained variance per factor 5.24–9.84%).
The pattern matrices of the resulting factor solutions for the
Relevance and Judgement scales are given in Tables S3 and S4.
For both Relevance and Judgement, the resulting seven factors
clearly corresponded to the seven hypothesised moral domains.
All items loaded highest on their corresponding factor, with an
average factor loading of 0.69 for Relevance (ranging from 0.45
to 0.84), and an average of 0.63 for Judgement (ranging from
0.42 to 0.82). Cross-loadings were all smaller than 0.24 (absolute
value), which is negligible.
4.2.3.3. Confirmatory factor analysis. We conducted confirmatory
factor analysis in order to measure the objective fit of our seven-
factor models to the data (Table S5).10 MAC’s seven-factor model
was found to have a ‘good’ (RMSEA), ‘acceptable’ (CFI), and ‘good’
(SRMR) fit for the Relevance data, and a ‘mediocre’ (RMSEA), ‘unac-
ceptable’ (CFI), and ‘good’ (SRMR) fit for the Judgement data.
4.2.4. Combining the scales
Whether and to what extent the Relevance and Judgement
scales differ, and whether it is necessary to account for potential
discrepancies between them to make a unified scale, has never
been explicitly tested. Here we remedy this by comparing a model
that does not take any difference between Relevance and Judge-
ment into account, with two alternative models that do.
We began by examining the mean score correlations before
model estimation (and latent variable correlations derived from
the final model). These revealed that most subscales were moder-
ately correlated, but Fairness and Property were not (Table S6), and
that it would be important to take this discrepancy into account
when combining the scales.
First, we considered the ‘‘simple domains” approach taken by
MFT/MFQ, whereby Relevance and Judgement items are taken
together as indicators of the seven underlying moral domains. Sec-
ond, we considered a ‘‘different but related” approach, whereby
separate latent variables are estimated for each of the seven Rele-
vance and Judgement subscales, and these latent variables are
allowed to correlate freely. Third, we considered a ‘‘multi-trait,
multi-method” approach (Widaman, 1985), which separates the
variance of each questionnaire item into two components: A ‘‘trait”
component, and a ‘‘method” component. In this case, the ‘‘trait”
components are seven latent constructs, reflecting the moral
domains. Two ‘‘method” components capture variance introduced
by the two questionnaire versions: Relevance versus Judgement.
The model thus reflects the assumption that there are seven under-
lying domains of morality (traits), which might be tapped in
slightly different ways by the Relevance and the Judgement ques-
tionnaires. This allows us to estimate people’s scores on the moral
domains, controlling for variance relating to the two questionnaire
versions. Results of these three models are given in Table S7.11 TheBayesian Information Criterion (saBIC), which can be used to compare non-nested
models (Kline, 2005). Lower values on these indices indicate better fit. And third,
Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-square difference tests, which indicate whether the fit of
one model is significantly different from the fit of another (p < .05) (Satorra & Bentler,
2010).
Table 2
MAC-Q subscales: Means, standard deviations & alphas.
mean sd sk sk/2*se ku ku/2*se a Interpretation
Relevance
Family 67.02 18.56 0.63 4.79 0.18 0.67 0.86 Good
Group 59.77 18.43 0.58 4.41 0.17 0.67 0.86 Good
Reciprocity 66.45 18.01 0.72 5.49 0.53 2.02 0.83 Good
Heroism 61.84 19.00 0.55 4.22 0.13 0.51 0.84 Good
Deference 53.89 19.14 0.35 2.66 0.22 0.85 0.80 Good
Fairness 56.47 18.20 0.40 3.02 0.12 0.45 0.76 Acceptable
Property 65.53 19.04 0.64 4.89 0.18 0.70 0.80 Good
Judgment
Family 67.76 17.50 0.49 3.71 0.17 0.63 0.83 Good
Group 64.64 14.82 0.51 3.85 0.77 2.92 0.75 Acceptable
Reciprocity 72.12 12.71 0.35 2.67 0.58 2.23 0.68 Questionable
Heroism 66.17 17.50 0.34 2.60 0.12 0.46 0.71 Acceptable
Deference 54.71 17.82 0.37 2.82 0.13 0.51 0.69 Questionable
Fairness 70.43 16.85 0.66 5.02 0.69 2.61 0.66 Questionable
Property 61.22 16.78 0.05 0.41 0.23 0.87 0.53 Poor
Note. Range for all items is 0–100.
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able’ (CFI), and ‘not good’ (SRMR). The fit of the Different But Related
model was ‘good’ (RMSEA), ‘acceptable’ (CFI), and ‘good’ (SRMR). And
the fit of the Multi-Trait Multi-Method model was ‘good’ (RMSEA),
‘acceptable’ (CFI), and ‘good’ (SRMR). Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-
square difference tests (Satorra & Bentler, 2010) indicated that the
fit of all three models differed significantly from one another. Thus,
we can conclude that: the Simple Domains model was not sup-
ported; the two models that allowed potential discrepancies
between Relevance and Judgement ratings were better supported;
and of these two models, the Different but Related achieved the best
fit.4.3. Discussion
The results support MAC’s prediction about the content of
morality, namely that each of the seven types of cooperation would
be considered morally relevant. Indeed, the four new domains
uniquely predicted by MAC (family, reciprocity, heroism, property)
were considered more relevant than domains shared with MFT
(group, deference, fairness).
The results also support MAC’s predictions regarding the struc-
ture of morality, namely that each of the seven types of coopera-
tion would constitute a distinct domain. Exploratory factor
analysis delivered the predicted seven factors, on both the Rele-
vance and Judgement scales. And confirmatory factor analysis
demonstrated that the seven factor model was a good fit for both
scales, separately and combined. The results also suggest caution
when combining the scales: simply aggregating the two method-
ologically distinct Relevance and Judgement scales is inferior to a
model that accounts for potential discrepancies between them.
Thus, as uniquely predicted by MAC, the MAC-Q successfully
identifies novel moral domains relating to family, reciprocity (as
opposed to fairness), heroism, and property, thereby providing evi-
dence of domains not countenanced by previous theories. And the
MAC-Q also succeeds in distinguishing moral domains relating to
groups, deference and fairness not distinguished by previous mea-
sures. In this way, Study 1 provides a first glimpse of a larger,
higher resolution map of the moral domain.5. Study 2: Testing Moral Foundations (MFT/MFQ)
How does the MAC-Q compare to the MFQ? MFT suggests a
five-factor model of morality; however, previous research with
the MFQ has yielded mixed results. Here we conduct an indepen-dent test of MFT’s predictions. The results also allow us to investi-
gate whether MAC-Q provides a good measure of the domains
recognised by both theories (regarding groups, deference, and fair-
ness); and to test MAC’s prediction that domains not related to
specific forms of cooperation (Care and Purity) would not consti-
tute distinct domains.
5.1. Methods
Methods were identical to Study 1, with the following excep-
tions. We used the 30-item MFQ, with the original 1–6 scale
(Graham et al., 2011). And the data were gathered during the early
piloting and pre-testing phase of candidate MAC-Q items, on three
separate occasions: from the 3rd to the 4th of December 2013; and
the 11th of April to the 11th May, and the 16th to the 18th of
September 2014. (Participants also completed a short-form version
of the Big Five Inventory, not reported here (Rammstedt & John,
2007).
5.2. Results
1467 accessed the survey online. After removing inattentive
(111), incomplete (67) and spoiled (247) responses the final sam-
ple consisted of 1042 UK working-age adults (541 males, 499
females, 2 transgender; age, Mean = 48.06 years, SD = 13.94).
5.2.1. Content
Descriptives for the MFQ Relevance and Judgement items given
in Tables S8 and S9. Descriptives for the five subscales, for the Rel-
evance and Judgement scales, are given in Table 3. Ratings for the
Relevance items ranged from ‘slightly’ (‘conforming to tradition’,
‘acting in a way that God would approve’) to ‘very’ relevant to
morality. Ratings for the Relevance items ranged from ‘somewhat’
to ‘very’ relevant (Care).
5.2.2. Structure
5.2.2.1. Internal consistency. Cronbach’s alpha for the five subscales
(Table 3) ranged from 0.60 to 0.75 for Relevance, and 0.28 to 0.68
for Judgement.
5.2.2.2. Exploratory factor analysis. Again, although we had a priori
hypotheses about the factor structure, we first conducted explora-
tory factor analyses, on each scale separately, to see whether the
hypothesised structure emerged from the data. The determinants
for Relevance and Judgement were both below the threshold of
Table 3
MFQ subscales: Means, standard deviations & alphas.
mean sd sk sk/2*se ku ku/2*se a
Relevance
Care 4.63 0.86 0.43 2.83 0.16 0.52 0.75 Acceptable
Fairness 4.46 0.86 0.29 1.88 0.02 0.08 0.75 Acceptable
Ingroup 3.77 0.99 0.13 0.85 0.26 0.85 0.74 Acceptable
Authority 3.89 0.90 0.20 1.32 0.14 0.47 0.65 Questionable
Purity 3.80 1.03 0.12 0.82 0.15 0.49 0.60 Questionable
Judgment
Care 4.70 0.86 0.47 3.08 0.33 1.10 0.47 Unacceptable
Fairness 4.39 0.73 0.04 0.28 0.27 0.90 0.28 Unacceptable
Ingroup 3.92 0.88 0.13 0.86 0.10 0.33 0.51 Poor
Authority 4.42 0.90 0.45 3.00 0.12 0.39 0.54 Poor
Purity 4.02 1.07 0.38 2.51 0.20 0.66 0.68 Questionable
Note. Range for all subscales is 1–6.
12 The internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) of the MFQ’s foundation-specific
subscales has been low, for Relevance (range = 0.39–0.76 in Graham et al., 2009;
range = 0.65–0.71 in Graham et al., 2011) and especially for Judgement (range = 0.24–
0.74 in Graham et al., 2009; range = 0.40–0.75 in Graham et al., 2011).
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Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin index indicated superb sampling adequacy
for Relevance (KMO = 0.92, individual items: 0.89–0.95), and mer-
itorious sampling adequacy for Judgement (KMO = 0.84, individual
items: 0.58–0.88). Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated that nei-
ther of the correlation matrices were identity matrices, Relevance
v2(105) = 5927.70, p < .001, and Judgement v2(105) = 3053.52,
p < .001. The data are thus fit for factor analysis.
For the Relevance scale, parallel analysis revealed that only
three factors had eigenvalues greater than those derived from ran-
domly generated data. These factors explained 48% of variance in
participants’ responses (explained variance per factor ranged from
7% to 21%). The pattern matrix of the resulting factor solution for
the Relevance scale is displayed in Table S10. The three factors
can be interpreted as: (i) Care/Fairness, (ii) Ingroup/Authority,
and (iii) Disgust (consisting of a single item). The average factor
loading was 0.60 (ranging from 0.33 to 0.76); cross-loadings were
all smaller than 0.31 (absolute values). Extracting five factors did
not reveal the hypothesised domains (also Table S10).
For the Judgement scale, parallel analysis revealed that five fac-
tors had eigenvalues greater than those derived from randomly
generated data. These factors explained 40% of variance in partici-
pants’ responses (explained variance per factor ranged from 5% to
10%). The pattern matrix of the resulting factor solution for the
Judgement scale is given in Table S11. The resulting five factors
can be interpreted as: (i) Care/Fairness, (ii) Purity, (iii) Patriotic
Authority, (iv) Family and (v) Gender Roles (consisting of a single
item). These do not correspond closely to the five hypothesised
foundations. The average absolute factor loading was 0.54 (ranging
from 0.34 to 0.71); cross-loadings were all smaller than 0.25 (abso-
lute values).
5.2.2.3. Confirmatory factor analysis. We conducted confirmatory
factor analysis in order to measure the objective fit of MFT’s five-
factor model to the data (Table S12). The five-factor model pro-
vides a ‘mediocre’ (RMSEA), ‘acceptable’ (CFI), and ‘good’ (SRMR)
fit to the Relevance data, and a ’mediocre’ (RMSEA), ‘unacceptable’
(CFI), and ‘good’ (SRMR) fit to the Judgement data.
5.2.3. Combining the scales
Again, we investigated whether and to what extent these two
scales form one unified measure, or whether it is necessary to
account for potential discrepancies between them. Mean score cor-
relations before model estimation (and latent variable correlations
derived from the final model) revealed that most subscales were
moderately correlated (Table S13). Nevertheless, we compared
the same three models as before, as well as a fourth Hierarchical
model (Graham et al., 2011), which represents the two super-
factors of individualising and binding (Table S14).The fit of the Simple Domains model was ‘mediocre’ (RMSEA),
‘unacceptable’ (CFI), and ‘not good’ (SRMR). The fit of the Different
But Related model was ’mediocre’ (RMSEA), ‘unacceptable’ (CFI),
and ‘good’ (SRMR). The fit of the Multi-Trait Multi-Method model
was ’mediocre’ (RMSEA), ‘acceptable’ (CFI), and ‘good’ (SRMR).
The fit of the Hierarchical model was ‘mediocre’ (RMSEA), ‘unac-
ceptable’ (CFI), and ‘not good’ (SRMR). Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-
square difference tests indicated that the fit of the Multi-Trait
Multi-Method model did not differ significantly from that of the
Different but Related model, but both of these models fit signifi-
cantly better than the five-factor Simple Domains model com-
monly used in the literature, and better than the Hierarchical
model. Thus the data did not support the Simple Domains model,
or the Hierarchical model. The best fitting models were those that
allowed for potential discrepancies between Relevance and Judge-
ment ratings – the Multi-Trait Multi-Method and Different But
Related models.5.3. Discussion
The results of this study support MFT’s claim that the contents
of the five foundations are considered morally relevant. As such,
the results support MAC’s prediction that cooperative behaviour
relating to groups, deference and fairness (as well as the general
category of ‘care’) will be regarded as morally relevant; but they
appear to contradict MAC’s prediction that ‘purity’ will not be con-
sidered morally relevant.
However, the results do not support MFT’s proposed five-factor
structure of morality. Consistent with previous research, the over-
all internal reliability of the scale was low.12 Exploratory factor
analysis did not yield the predicted five factors, on either Relevance
or Judgement scales. (Nor did it reliably reveal the two ‘individualis-
ing’ and ‘binding’ factors.) Confirmatory analysis demonstrated that
none of the five-factor models achieved a good fit on all criteria,
either separately or when combined. Specifically, the MFQ was not
able to distinguish between moral attitudes relating to groups and
deference; Ingroup and Authority items loaded on the same factor.
Nor was the MFQ able to distinguish attitudes to fairness; Fairness
items loaded on the same factor as Care. Neither Care nor Purity
emerged as distinct factors on the Relevance scale, only Purity was
a distinct factor on the Judgement scale.
Thus MFT’s predictions were not supported. The MFQ was not
able to identify the domains uniquely predicted by MFT (Care
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(groups, deference and fairness) predicted by both MFT and MAC.
Taken together, the results of Studies 1 and 2 provide further
support for MAC. First, as MAC predicts, cooperative behaviour is
considered relevant to morality (although the relevance of ‘purity’
remains to be explained), and the seven distinct types of coopera-
tion give rise to seven distinct moral domains. Second, as MAC also
predicts, behaviours not tied to a specific form of cooperation
(‘care’ and ‘purity’) do not reliably emerge as distinct domains.
Third, the MAC-Q distinguishes distinct domains relating to
groups, deference and fairness, whereas the MFQ does not. And
fourth, the MAC-Q’s breadth of conceptual coverage, internal con-
sistency, factor structure, and model fit, are all superior to those of
the MFQ.
Of course, in order to provide a more robust test of MAC’s pre-
dictions, of the replicability of MAC’s proposed model, and to
establish the relative utility of the MAC-Q, it will be necessary to
examine the psychometric properties of the final scale, and com-
pare them to the MFQ.6. Study 3a: Confirming and Validating the MAC-Q
In order to replicate and confirm a further test of MAC’s predic-
tions regarding the content and structure of morality, to examine
the psychometric properties of the final scale (including its exter-
nal and predictive validity), and to investigate how these compare
to those of the MFQ, we gathered a further round of data using the
MAC-Q, the MFQ, and a range of external scales and measures
addressing related constructs.13 We also collected data on: Big 5 (Rammstedt & John, 2007); Social and Economic
Conservatism (Everett, 2013); Social Desirability Responding (Reynolds, 1982);
hypothetical kidney donation; age, sex, nationality/state, language, religion, religios-
ity, ethnicity, political affiliation, and voting intention, which we plan to report in
subsequent papers.6.1. Methods
Methods were identical to Study 1, with the following excep-
tions. Data were gathered 27 June to 12 July 2016. Participants
were recruited via a market polling firm (Qualtrics.com) in the
US. Participation took around 27 min, for which participants were
paid the equivalent of $0.75. We used the 42-item MAC-Q, the 30-
item MFQ, and a series of domain-related criteria scales to assess
divergent and convergent validity.
MAC Kinship criterion scales were the Relations subscale of the
Family Values Scale (FVS; Byrne & van de Vijver, 2014), and the
Family Security item from the Schwartz’s Basic Values Scale
(SVS; Schwartz, 1992). MAC Mutualism (and MFQ Ingroup) crite-
rion scales were the Citizen/Teamwork subscale of the Virtues in
Action Scale (VIA; Goldberg et al., 2006; Peterson & Seligman,
2004), the Loyalty and National Security items from the SVS, and
pictorial measures of Identify Fusion with Community and Country
(Gómez et al., 2011). MAC Reciprocity (and MFQ Fairness) criterion
scales were the Positive subscale of the Personal Norm of Reciproc-
ity Scale (PNR; Perugini et al., 2003), the Kindness/Generosity sub-
scale of the VIA, and the kindness the Reciprocation item from the
SVS. MAC Heroism criterion scales were the Valor/Bravery/Courage
subscale of the VIA, and the Power subscale of the VIA. MAC Defer-
ence (and MFQ Authority) criterion scales were the Conformity and
Tradition subscales of the SVS, and the Modesty/Humility subscale
of the VIA. MAC Fairness (and MFQ Fairness) criterion scales were
the Equity/Fairness subscale of the VIA, and the Equality and Social
Justice items from the SVS. MAC Property criterion scale was the
Wealth item from the SVS. In addition, we also collected data on
two criteria scales related to the additional MFQ domains. Care cri-
terion scales were items from the Benevolence subscale of the SVS.
And the Purity criterion scales were the self-discipline, clean, and
devout items on the SVS.
For predictive validity, we also included a new quasi-objective
measure of cooperative behaviour. The Cooperative Action Scaleasked participants how many times they had performed various
cooperative actions in past year (Table S32).13
6.2. Results
1157 accessed the survey online. After removing inattentive
(537), incomplete (70) and spoiled (81) responses the final sample
consisted of 469 US working-age adults (238 males, 230 females, 1
transgender; age, Mean = 46.82 years, SD = 16.78).
6.2.1. MAC-Q content
Descriptives for all MAC-Q Relevance and Judgement items are
given in Tables S15 and S16. Descriptives for all seven MAC-Q sub-
scales are given in Table 4. Ratings for the Relevance items and
subscales ranged from ‘somewhat’ to ‘very’ relevant to morality.
6.2.2. MAC-Q structure
6.2.2.1. Internal consistency. Cronbach’s alphas for all seven sub-
scales (Table 4) ranged from 0.76 to 0.88 for Relevance, and 0.64
to 0.86 for Judgement.
6.2.2.2. Exploratory factor analysis. Once again, we conducted
exploratory factor analyses, on each scale separately, to see
whether the hypothesised structure emerged from the data. The
determinant for Relevance fell slightly below the threshold of
1e5, 3.10e06. The determinant for Judgement was good,
1.95e4. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin index indicated superb sampling
adequacy for Relevance (KMO = 0.93, individual items: 0.87–0.95),
and meritorious sampling adequacy for Judgement (KMO = 0.88,
individual items: 0.68–0.95). Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated
that neither of the correlation matrices were identity matrices,
moral Relevance v2(210) = 5836.55, p < .001, and Judgement
v2(210) = 3920.71, p < .001. The data are thus fit for factor analysis.
For the Relevance scale, parallel analysis revealed that seven
factors had eigenvalues greater than those derived from randomly
generated data. These factors explained 66% of variance in partici-
pants’ responses (explained variance per factor ranged from 7% to
11%). The pattern matrix of the resulting factor solution for the Rel-
evance scale is given in Table S17. The resulting seven factors
clearly corresponded to the seven hypothesised moral domains.
All items loaded highest on their corresponding factor, with an
average factor loading of 0.69 (ranging from 0.45 to 0.84). Cross-
loadings were all smaller than 0.24 (absolute value), which is
negligible.
For the Judgement scale, parallel analysis revealed that five fac-
tors had eigenvalues greater than those derived from randomly
generated data. These factors explained 51% of variance in partici-
pants’ responses (explained variance per factor 8–13%). The pat-
tern matrix of the resulting factor solution for the Judgement
scale is displayed in Table S18. The five factors can be interpreted
as: (i) Family, (ii) Group/Reciprocity, (iii) Martial Virtues, (iv) Fair-
ness and (v) Property. Broadly speaking, mutualism and reciproc-
ity, and heroism and deference, were combined. The average
absolute factor loading was 0.58 (ranging from 0.29 to 1.01);
cross-loadings were all smaller than 0.40 (absolute values). How-
ever, extracting seven factors did reveal the hypothesised domains
(also Table S18), with all items loading highest on their corre-
sponding factor, with an average factor loading of 0.60 for Rele-
vance (ranging from 0.34 to 0.87), and cross-loadings smaller
than 0.38 (absolute value).
Table 4
MAC-Q subscales: Means, standard deviations, alphas & retest reliabilities.
mean sd sk sk/2*se ku ku/2*se a Interpretation Retest
Relevance
Family 73.50 20.27 1.00 4.45 1.08 2.39 0.87 Good 0.88
Group 66.90 20.94 0.82 3.65 0.61 1.36 0.88 Good 0.89
Reciprocity 76.18 18.04 0.91 4.02 0.82 1.82 0.84 Good 0.86
Heroism 67.94 20.53 0.81 3.58 0.56 1.24 0.82 Good 0.84
Deference 65.20 20.77 0.68 3.01 0.35 0.77 0.79 Acceptable 0.81
Fairness 61.59 20.56 0.47 2.10 0.04 0.09 0.76 Acceptable 0.79
Property 70.40 21.96 0.94 4.18 0.62 1.37 0.84 Good 0.86
Judgment
Family 71.01 20.80 0.77 3.43 0.31 0.68 0.86 Good 0.87
Group 71.58 16.19 0.59 2.60 0.86 1.90 0.73 Acceptable 0.74
Reciprocity 77.24 14.19 0.44 1.97 0.09 0.20 0.70 Acceptable 0.71
Heroism 73.58 17.72 0.84 3.71 0.75 1.66 0.76 Acceptable 0.78
Deference 64.15 19.07 0.63 2.79 0.20 0.45 0.71 Acceptable 0.71
Fairness 77.66 16.53 1.15 5.11 2.25 5.01 0.64 Questionable 0.66
Property 62.16 22.79 0.39 1.73 0.68 1.51 0.70 Acceptable 0.71
Note. Range for all items is 0–100.
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found to have a ‘good’ (RMSEA), ‘acceptable’ (CFI), and ‘good’
(SRMR) fit for the Relevance data, and a ‘mediocre’ (RMSEA), ‘unac-
ceptable’ (CFI), and ‘good’ (SRMR) fit for the Judgement data
(Table S19).
6.2.3. Combining the scales
Again, we investigated whether and to what extent these two
scales form one unified measure, or whether it is necessary to
account for potential discrepancies between them.
Mean score correlations before model estimation (and latent
variable correlations derived from the final model) revealed that
most subscales were moderately correlated, but Fairness and Prop-
erty were not (Table S20). This again suggested that it would be
necessary to take this discrepancy into account when creating a
scale that combined the two Relevance and Judgement scales
(Table S21).
The fit of the Simple Domains model was ‘unacceptable’
(RMSEA), ‘unacceptable’ (CFI), and ‘not good’ (SRMR). The fit of
the Different But Related model was ‘good’ (RMSEA), ‘acceptable’
(CFI), and ‘good’ (SRMR). The fit of the Multi-Trait Multi-Method
model was ‘good/mediocre’ (RMSEA), ‘unacceptable’ (CFI), and
‘good’ (SRMR). Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-square difference tests
indicated that the fit of all three models differed significantly from
one another. Thus the Simple Domains model was not supported.
The two models that allowed potential discrepancies between Rel-
evance and Judgement ratings achieved a significantly better fit on
all indices. And of these two models, the Different but Related
model achieved the best fit.Table 5
MFQ subscales: Means, standard deviations, alphas & retest reliabilities.
mean sd sk sk/2*se
Relevance
Care 4.77 0.95 0.99 4.39
Fairness 4.73 0.98 0.89 3.97
Ingroup 4.31 1.05 0.61 2.69
Authority 4.31 1.00 0.60 2.66
Purity 4.19 1.22 0.57 2.51
Judgment
Care 4.68 0.95 0.62 2.75
Fairness 4.39 0.87 0.44 1.96
Ingroup 4.02 1.08 0.27 1.19
Authority 4.50 0.95 0.68 3.01
Purity 4.14 1.23 0.62 2.73
Note. Range for all subscales is 1–6.6.2.4. MFQ content
Descriptives for all MFQ Relevance and Judgement items are
given in Tables S22 and S23. Descriptives for all five MFQ subscales
are given in Table 5. Ratings for the Relevance items and subscales
ranged from ‘somewhat’ to ‘very’ relevant to morality.
6.2.5. MFQ structure
6.2.5.1. Internal consistency. Cronbach’s alphas for the five sub-
scales ranged from 0.66 to 0.77 for Relevance, and 0.44 to 0.75
for Judgement.
6.2.5.2. Exploratory factor analysis. Again, we first conducted
exploratory factor analyses, on each scale separately, to see
whether the hypothesised structure emerged from the data. The
determinants for Relevance and Judgement were both above the
threshold of 1 * 105 (det = 7.63 * 104 and 2.00 * 102, respec-
tively), indicating the correlation matrices were fit for factor
analysis.
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin index indicated superb sampling ade-
quacy for Relevance (KMO = 0.93, individual items: 0.86–0.95),
and meritorious sampling adequacy for Judgement (KMO = 0.85,
individual items: 0.70–0.89). Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated
that neither of the correlation matrices were identity matrices, Rel-
evance v2(105) = 3317.67, p < .001, and Judgement v2(105) =
1810.67, p < .001. The data are thus fit for factor analysis.
For the Relevance scale, parallel analysis revealed that only two
factors had eigenvalues greater than those derived from randomly
generated data. These factors explained 51% of variance in partici-
pants’ responses (explained variance per factor 24% - 27%). Theku ku/2*se a Interpetation Retest
1.38 3.07 0.76 Acceptable 0.78
1.16 2.57 0.77 Acceptable 0.80
0.13 0.28 0.75 Acceptable 0.77
0.42 0.93 0.66 Questionable 0.70
0.40 0.89 0.72 Acceptable 0.74
0.23 0.51 0.49 Unacceptable 0.51
0.31 0.69 0.44 Unacceptable 0.46
0.51 1.14 0.60 Questionable 0.62
0.50 1.11 0.56 Poor 0.59
0.22 0.48 0.75 Acceptable 0.75
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scale is displayed in Table S24. The two factors can be interpreted
as: (i) Care/Fairness, (ii) Ingroup/Authority/Purity (with one errant
item, Chaos). The average factor loading was 0.65 (ranging from
0.44 to 0.78); cross-loadings were all smaller than 0.39 (absolute
values). Extracting five factors did not reveal the hypothesised
domains (also Table S24).
For the Judgement scale, parallel analysis revealed that four fac-
tors had eigenvalues greater than those derived from randomly
generated data. These factors explained 43% of variance in partici-
pants’ responses (explained variance per factor 7–15%). The pat-
tern matrix of the resulting factor solution for the Judgement
scale is displayed in Table S30. The two factors can be interpreted
as: (i) Care/Government Fairness, (ii) Family/Team, (iii) Martial Vir-
tue/Inheritance and (iv) Purity/Sex Roles. The average absolute fac-
tor loading was 0.54 (ranging from 0.35 to 0.78); cross-loadings
were all smaller than 0.48 (absolute values). Extracting five factors
did not reveal the hypothesised domains (also Table S25).
6.2.5.3. Confirmatory factor analysis. Despite the fact that explora-
tory factor analysis did not reveal MFT’s five-factor structure, we
proceeded to conduct confirmatory factor analysis in order to mea-
sure the objective fit of MFT’s five-factor model to the data
(Table S26). The five-factor model provides a ‘mediocre’ (RMSEA),
‘unacceptable’ (CFI), and ‘good’ (SRMR) fit to the Relevance data,
and a ‘unacceptable’ (RMSEA), ‘unacceptable’ (CFI), and ‘good’
(SRMR) fit to the Judgement data.
6.2.6. Combining the scales
Again, we investigated whether and to what extent these two
scales form one unified measure, or whether it is necessary to
account for potential discrepancies between them.
Mean score correlations before model estimation (and latent
variable correlations derived from the final model) revealed that
most subscales were moderately correlated (Table S27). Neverthe-
less, we compared the same models as before (Table S28).
The fit of the Simple Domains model was ‘unacceptable’
(RMSEA), ‘unacceptable’ (CFI), and ‘not good’ (SRMR). The fit of
the Different But Related model was ‘mediocre’ (RMSEA), ‘unac-
ceptable’ (CFI), and ‘good’ (SRMR). The fit of the Multi-Trait
Multi-Method model was ‘mediocre’ (RMSEA), ‘acceptable’ (CFI),
and ‘good’ (SRMR). And the fit of the Hierarchical model was ‘unac-
ceptable’ (RMSEA), ‘unacceptable’ (CFI), and ‘not good’ (SRMR).
According to Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-square difference tests,
the Multi-Trait Multi-Method model fit significantly better than
all alternative models. Thus the data did not support the five-
factor Simple Domains model, the Different But Related model, or
the Hierarchical model. Again, the only model to achieve adequate
fit on all indices was one that allowed for potential discrepancies
between Relevance and Judgement ratings: the Multi-Trait Multi-
Method.
6.2.7. MAC and MFQ external and predictive validity
6.2.7.1. External validity
Correlations between the MAC-Q subscales and the external cri-
terion scales, as well as the average correlation for each criterion
group, are shown in Table 6.14 For MAC-Q Relevance, each subscale
was correlated with its own conceptually related group of external
scales, with the exception of Property; however, only Family and
Deference were the strongest predictors for their own conceptually14 Correlations were transformed to Fisher’s z-values, the z-values were averaged,
and the average z-values back-transformed to correlations (Fisher, 1915).related group of external scales. For MAC-Q Judgement, each sub-
scale was the strongest predictors for its own conceptually related
group of external scales, with the exception of Group. Correlations
between the MFQ subscales and the external criterion scales are
shown in Table 7. For MFQ Relevance, each subscale was the stron-
gest predictors for its own conceptually related group of external
scales. For MFQ Judgement, each subscale was correlated with its
own conceptually related group of external scales; however, only
Fairness, Ingroup and Purity were the strongest predictors for their
own conceptually related group of external scales.
Correlations between the Cooperative Actions and MAC-Q and
MFQ subscales are shown in Tables S29 and S30.
6.2.7.2. Incremental predictive validity
Following Graham (2011), we used two-step regressions to test
whether the seven MAC-Q subscales added incremental predictive
validity beyond the five MFQ subscales for the external criteria
described above, as well as for the cooperative actions.
Overall, the MAC-Q was a better predictor of Family, Group,
Heroism and Property external scales, whereas the MFQ was a bet-
ter predictor of Deference and Fairness (Table 8). And the MAC-Q
was a better predictor than the MFQ of Cooperative Actions in
ten cases, equal on three, and worse on one (Table S31).7. Study 3b: MAC-Q and MFQ Test-retest reliability
To establish and compare the test-retest reliability of the MAC-
Q and the MFQ, participants from Study 3a were invited to com-
plete both measures a second time after a one month interval
(16–18 August 2016), for which they were paid $1.50. 151 partic-
ipants completed the survey; after removing those who had been
excluded from Study 3a, the final sample consisted of 137 partici-
pants (68 males, 69 females; age, Mean = 53.10 years, SD = 15.84)
completed it.
Test-retest Pearson correlations (corrected for attenuation) are
provided in Table 4 for the MAC-Q and Table 5 for the MFQ. For
the MAC-Q, stability coefficients ranged from 0.79 to 0.89 (‘good’)
for Relevance and 0.66–0.87 (‘acceptable’ to ‘good’) for Judgement.
For the MFQ, they were 0.70–0.80 (‘acceptable’) for Relevance, and
0.46–0.75 (‘poor’ to ‘acceptable’) for Judgement.
7.1. Discussion
Consistent with the results of Study 1, the results of Study 3 pro-
vide further support for MAC’s prediction that each of the seven
types of cooperation would be considered morally relevant. Again,
the four novel domains proposed byMAC (family, reciprocity, hero-
ism, and property) were all consideredmore relevant than the three
domains also proposed byMFT (group, deference, and fairness). The
results also provide further support for MAC’s predictions that each
of the seven types of cooperation would constitute a distinct
domain. Exploratory factor analysis delivered the predicted seven
factors, on both the Relevance and (to a lesser extent) Judgement
scales. And confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated that the
seven factor model was a reasonable fit for both scales separately,
and a good fit when combined. (And again, simply aggregating
the two methodologically distinct Relevance and Judgement scales
was shown to be inferior to a model that accounts for potential dis-
crepancies between them.) Thus, as uniquely predicted byMAC, the
MAC-Q once again successfully identifies novel moral domains
relating to family, reciprocity (as opposed to fairness), heroism,
and property; and it succeeds in distinguishing moral domains
relating to groups, deference and fairness.
Turning to the MFQ, consistent with Study 2, the results from
Study3 supportMFT’s claim that the contentsof thefive foundations
Table 6
Pearson correlations of MAC-Q subscales with external scales and scale items.
Relevance Subscales Judgment Subscales
External scale criteria group Family Group Reciprocity Heroism Deference Fairness Property Family Group Reciprocity Heroism Deference Fairness Property
Family
FVS (Relations) 0.48 0.25 0.29 0.35 0.37 0.15 0.20 0.55 0.39 0.50 0.46 0.45 0.16 0.23
SVS: Family Security Item 0.43 0.31 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.18 0.26 0.38 0.34 0.30 0.29 0.23 0.16 0.16
Average 0.46 0.28 0.26 0.30 0.31 0.17 0.23 0.47 0.37 0.40 0.38 0.34 0.16 0.20
Group
SVS: Loyal Item 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.34 0.34 0.30 0.22 0.19 0.14
SVS: National Security Item 0.31 0.21 0.23 0.27 0.34 0.16 0.22 0.32 0.27 0.32 0.44 0.33 0.07 0.17
VIA: Citizen/Teamwork 0.08 0.16 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.17 0.04 0.10 0.16 0.19 0.10 0.18 0.14 0.30
Community Fusion 0.26 0.31 0.16 0.23 0.17 0.13 0.02 0.28 0.36 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.13 0.06
Country Fusion 0.35 0.25 0.24 0.32 0.29 0.13 0.07 0.41 0.26 0.31 0.40 0.37 0.08 0.06
Average 0.27 0.24 0.20 0.24 0.23 0.16 0.11 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.28 0.12 0.00
Reciprocity
PNR (Positive) 0.32 0.24 0.28 0.34 0.21 0.14 0.18 0.27 0.32 0.56 0.34 0.17 0.19 0.17
SVS: Reciprocation Item 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.25 0.12 0.15 0.24 0.32 0.25 0.22 0.13 0.01
VIA: Kindess/Generosity 0.34 0.34 0.23 0.33 0.34 0.26 0.16 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.42 0.19 0.16
Average 0.29 0.28 0.25 0.30 0.25 0.22 0.15 0.26 0.31 0.42 0.31 0.27 0.17 0.00
Heroism
VIA: Valor/Bravery/Courage 0.19 0.26 0.11 0.21 0.15 0.24 0.05 0.20 0.27 0.21 0.19 0.23 0.17 0.32
Deference
VIA: Modesty/Humility 0.29 0.27 0.20 0.26 0.29 0.27 0.14 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.38 0.20 0.14
SVS: Tradition 0.39 0.38 0.23 0.33 0.42 0.28 0.16 0.47 0.42 0.35 0.42 0.55 0.14 0.04
SVS: Conformity 0.43 0.32 0.26 0.32 0.45 0.26 0.23 0.44 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.47 0.15 0.12
SVS: Power 0.22 0.26 0.09 0.27 0.23 0.28 0.01 0.35 0.30 0.22 0.31 0.44 0.08 0.36
Average 0.34 0.31 0.20 0.30 0.35 0.27 0.14 0.39 0.35 0.31 0.36 0.46 0.14 0.11
Fairness
VIA: Equity/Fairness 0.31 0.35 0.23 0.25 0.21 0.29 0.20 0.24 0.38 0.37 0.31 0.28 0.42 0.05
SVS: Equality Item 0.22 0.24 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.18 0.11 0.16 0.34 0.28 0.20 0.17 0.55 0.08
SVS: Social Justice Item 0.30 0.36 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.41 0.31 0.20 0.18 0.40 0.02
Average 0.28 0.32 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.24 0.18 0.20 0.38 0.32 0.24 0.21 0.46 0.02
Property
SVS: Wealth item 0.09 0.16 0.02 0.14 0.09 0.16 0.03 0.23 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.24 0.05 0.35
Care
SVS: Friendship Item 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.26 0.25 0.21 0.10 0.19 0.12
Purity
SVS: Self-discipline Item 0.26 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.25 0.13 0.14 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.22 0.08 0.12
SVS: Clean Item 0.35 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.30 0.24 0.15 0.38 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.36 0.21 0.06
SVS: Devout Item 0.31 0.28 0.16 0.25 0.35 0.12 0.10 0.41 0.32 0.24 0.32 0.46 0.02 0.03
Average 0.31 0.24 0.20 0.23 0.30 0.16 0.13 0.34 0.28 0.27 0.30 0.35 0.10 0.07
















Pearson correlations of MFQ subscales with external scales and scale items.
Relevance Subscales Judgment Subscales
External scale criteria group Care Fairness Ingroup Authority Purity Care Fairness Ingroup Authority Purity
Family
FVS (Relations) 0.34 0.28 0.38 0.41 0.43 0.31 0.23 0.42 0.48 0.40
SVS: Family Security Item 0.38 0.30 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.26 0.22 0.27 0.26
Average 0.36 0.29 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.31 0.25 0.32 0.38 0.33
Group
SVS: Loyal Item 0.34 0.34 0.39 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.23 0.25 0.25
SVS: National Security Item 0.29 0.24 0.39 0.43 0.39 0.29 0.26 0.33 0.37 0.34
VIA: Citizen/Teamwork 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.27 0.18 0.15 0.14
Community Fusion 0.10 0.13 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.21 0.20 0.26 0.09 0.25
Country Fusion 0.15 0.13 0.34 0.31 0.34 0.17 0.14 0.39 0.29 0.26
Average 0.20 0.20 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.23 0.25
Reciprocity
PNR (Positive) 0.33 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.33 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.28
SVS: Reciprocation Item 0.22 0.23 0.32 0.28 0.27 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.23 0.22
VIA: Kindess/Generosity 0.30 0.22 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.44 0.28 0.40
Average 0.28 0.23 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.27 0.30
Heroism
VIA: Valor/Bravery/Courage 0.20 0.17 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.34 0.33 0.20 0.27
Deference
VIA: Modesty/Humility 0.27 0.26 0.34 0.40 0.37 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.31 0.40
SVS: Tradition 0.28 0.20 0.46 0.48 0.55 0.36 0.36 0.49 0.47 0.51
SVS: Conformity 0.35 0.27 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.35 0.33 0.42 0.42 0.43
SVS: Power 0.06 0.07 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.23 0.32 0.48 0.28 0.29
Average 0.24 0.20 0.40 0.43 0.42 0.32 0.34 0.44 0.37 0.41
Fairness
VIA: Equity/Fairness 0.43 0.46 0.35 0.30 0.29 0.46 0.49 0.29 0.22 0.26
SVS: Equality Item 0.37 0.44 0.20 0.17 0.12 0.38 0.42 0.07 0.03 0.07
SVS: Social Justice Item 0.44 0.46 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.39 0.46 0.11 0.12 0.16
Average 0.41 0.45 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.41 0.46 0.16 0.12 0.16
Property
SVS: Wealth item 0.01 0.06 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.20 0.31 0.17 0.14
Care
SVS: Friendship Item 0.30 0.27 0.26 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.11 0.10 0.13
Purity
SVS: Self-discipline Item 0.26 0.18 0.28 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.21 0.24 0.28 0.28
SVS: Clean Item 0.29 0.26 0.39 0.35 0.35 0.30 0.29 0.36 0.30 0.33
SVS: Devout Item 0.19 0.08 0.36 0.39 0.59 0.25 0.19 0.39 0.39 0.52
Average 0.25 0.17 0.34 0.36 0.42 0.27 0.23 0.33 0.32 0.38
Note. The largest correlation for each set of scales is shown in bold. MFQ = Moral Foundations Questionnaire; SVS = Schwartz Values Scale; FVS = Family Values Scale;
PNR = Personal Norm of Reciprocity; VIA = Virtues in Action.
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that cooperative behaviour relating to groups, deference and
fairness (as well as the general category of ‘care’) will be regarded
as morally relevant, but contradicting the prediction that ‘purity’
will not. However, once again, the results do not support MFT’s pro-
posed five-factor structure of morality. Exploratory factor analysis
did not deliver the predicted five factors, on either Relevance or
Judgement scales. And confirmatory analysis demonstrated that
none of the five-factor models achieved a good fit on all criteria,
either separately or combined. (Again, simply aggregating the Rele-
vance and Judgement scaleswas shown tobe inferior to amodel that
accounts for potential discrepancies between them.) The MFQ was
not able to identify distinct domains of morality relating to groups,
authority and fairness. And neither Care nor Purity emerged as
distinct factors. Thus MFT’s predictions were not supported. The
MFQ was, once again, not able to identify the domains uniquely
predicted by MFT (Care and Purity); nor was it able to distinguish
the domains (groups, deference and fairness) predicted by both
MFT and MAC.
With regard to external and predictive validity, incremental
predictive validity, and test-retest reliability, the performance of
the MAC-Q and the MFQ was broadly comparable. Although should
it be noted that (a) the original MFQ items were prescreened fortheir correlations with SVS items, and (b) the results here do not
replicate the very high external validity previously reported for
the MFQ (Table 7; Graham et al., 2011).
In conclusion, when combined with the results of Studies 1 and
2, the results of Studies 3a and 3b provide further support for
MAC’s prediction that cooperative behaviour will be considered
relevant to morality, and that the seven distinct types of coopera-
tion give rise to seven distinct moral domains (including the novel
moral domains of family, reciprocity, heroism and property). More-
over, as MAC also predicts, behaviours not tied to a specific form of
cooperation (‘care’ and ‘purity’) do not emerge as distinct domains.
The MAC-Q yielded and distinguished between domains (groups,
deference and fairness) that MFQ did not. And the MAC-Q’s breadth
of conceptual coverage, internal consistency, factor structure, and
model fit, were superior to those of the MFQ.
8. General discussion
Morality-as-Cooperation (MAC) is the theory that morality
consists of a collection of solutions to recurrent problems of
cooperation. Here we have shown how the mathematics of
cooperation – derived from evolutionary biology and nonzero
sum game theory – can be used to develop this theory; and by
Table 8
Incremental predictive validity comparisons between MAC-Q and MFQ (Relevance/Judgment) for external scales and items.





















FVS (Relations) 0.29 0.22 0.12 0.06 0.44 0.29 0.19 0.04
SVS: Family Security Item 0.21 0.17 0.09 0.05 0.21 0.14 0.11 0.04
Group Scales
SVS: Loyal Item 0.13 0.18 0.02 0.08 0.17 0.16 0.07 0.05
SVS: National Security Item 0.15 0.21 0.02 0.08 0.24 0.20 0.08 0.05
VIA: Citizen/Teamwork 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.16 0.08 0.10 0.03
Community Fusion 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.16 0.11 0.07 0.03
Country Fusion 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.04 0.23 0.16 0.09 0.01
Reciprocity Scales
PNR (Positive) 0.14 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.34 0.16 0.24 0.06
SVS: Reciprocation Item 0.10 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.05 0.03
VIA: Kindess/Generosity 0.17 0.21 0.04 0.07 0.26 0.30 0.04 0.08
Heroism Scales
VIA: Valor/Bravery/Courage 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.19 0.18 0.09 0.07
Deference Scales
VIA: Modesty/Humility 0.13 0.18 0.03 0.08 0.20 0.25 0.03 0.09
SVS: Tradition 0.24 0.33 0.06 0.15 0.36 0.38 0.06 0.08
SVS: Conformity 0.26 0.29 0.05 0.08 0.31 0.30 0.07 0.06
SVS: Power 0.17 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.35 0.26 0.13 0.05
Fairness Scales
VIA: Equity/Fairness 0.15 0.24 0.04 0.13 0.26 0.31 0.05 0.10
SVS: Equality Item 0.09 0.20 0.05 0.16 0.32 0.25 0.12 0.05
SVS: Social Justice Item 0.16 0.23 0.06 0.13 0.24 0.26 0.07 0.09
Property Scales
SVS: Wealth item 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.20 0.11 0.12 0.02
Care
SVS: Friendship Item 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.02
Purity
SVS: Self-discipline Item 0.09 0.13 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.03 0.05
SVS: Clean Item 0.15 0.17 0.04 0.06 0.20 0.20 0.04 0.04
SVS: Devout Item 0.17 0.37 0.04 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.06 0.09
Note. Bold indicates which scale, MAC-Q or MFQ, is the stronger predictor alone.
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have extended the theory to incorporate and explain more aspects
of morality than previous cooperative accounts.
We have also tested MAC’s predictions regarding the content
and structure of morality, over the course of four studies. Regard-
ing content, the results support the prediction that all seven types
of cooperative behaviours – helping kin, helping one’s group, recip-
rocating costs and benefits, displaying ‘hawkish’ and dove-ish
traits, dividing disputed resources, and respecting prior possession
– will be considered relevant to morality. And regarding structure,
the results support the prediction that there will be distinct moral
domains dedicated to family, groups, reciprocity, heroism, defer-
ence, fairness and property. In this way, MAC goes beyond previous
theories of morality, including MFT, to identify for the first time
novel moral domains of morality relating to family, reciprocity,
heroism and property.
More specifically, the results support MAC’s claim that (con-
trary to RMT) ‘family’ can be distinguished from ‘group’, and (con-
trary to MFT and RMT) ‘reciprocity’ can be distinguished from
‘fairness’. And the results support MAC’s prediction that behaviour
not tied to specific forms of cooperation (‘care’ and ‘purity’) will not
form distinct moral domains (consistent with RMT, and RMT and
TDM, respectively).
These studies have also produced a new scale for the measure-
ment of morality – the MAC-Q – that exhibits broader and more
detailed coverage than, and superior psychometric properties to,
the previous leading scale. The results also question the routinecombination of Relevance and Judgement scales. As originally antic-
ipated (Graham et al., 2009), the Relevance and Judgement scales
seem to measure somewhat disparate aspects of morality. Across
three studies, we found consistent evidence indicating that Rele-
vance and Judgement items should not be combined into a common
scale without accounting for their differences. Until the reasons for
this discrepancy betweenmoral relevance and judgement is under-
stood, we recommend either combining the measures using a
MTMM model, as described above, or using one or both scales
separately.
8.1. Limitations and future directions
First, the present study tested the general theory of MAC with
respect to seven specific types of cooperation. Future research
search should test the theory more widely still, using additional
examples of cooperative behaviour. These might include ‘subcom-
ponents’ of the types of cooperation discussed here; for example,
‘social exchange’ involves not just reciprocity, but also trust, grat-
itude, guilt, apology and forgiveness. Or it might include novel
types of cooperation yet to be discovered or adumbrated by game
theory and the behavioural sciences. Such research could extend
MAC to other, as yet poorly understood, aspects of morality.
Second, the present study found that even though ‘care’ and
‘purity’ did not reliably emerge as unitary domains, the items they
contained were nevertheless rated as relevant to morality. Future
research should aim to explain why. Perhaps, as MAC suggests,
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such as sympathy and disgust, that contribute to the solution of
multiple distinct problems of cooperation.15
Third, the present study has successfully ‘isolated’ seven differ-
ent types of morality. Future research should investigate how they
interact. For example, MAC predicts that having to choose between
alternative, incompatible cooperative courses of actionwill give rise
to moral dilemmas. Should you tend to your ailing mother, or go off
to fight for your country (Sartre, 1946/1973)?MACalso predicts that
when one cooperative opportunity is pursued at the expense of
some larger more valuable opportunity (‘the greater good’), the for-
mer will be regarded as (relatively) morally bad (Muthukrishna,
Francois, Pourahmadi, & Henrich, 2017). And MAC suggests that
these seven first-order ‘moral elements’ may combine to form 21
second-order ‘moral molecules’ (and 35 third-order molecules,
and so on). For example, Family andDeferencemay combine to form
Filial Piety (Nichols, 2013). Investigating how dilemmas arise and
are resolved, and how higher-order concepts emerge, could extend
the explanatory scope of the theory further still.
Fourth, the present study has looked for invariant aspects of
morality, in two English-speaking Western, Educated, Industri-
alised, Rich, Democratic cultures (W.E.I.R.D; Henrich, Heine, &
Norenzayan, 2010). Future research should test this factor-
structure in a wider range of languages and cultures, and investi-
gate how morality varies between individuals, within and between
cultures – especially, whether moral values reflect the value of dif-
ferent types of cooperation under different social conditions.
Fifth, reviewing the final set of items, we note the possibility
that some may be less-than-optimally phrased. For example, it’s
possible that questions that use comparative (‘‘there should be
more X”), superlative (‘‘Y is the most admirable trait”) or extreme
(‘‘you should always do Z”) terms may be somewhat ambiguous,
and hence difficult to interpret. Participants may value X, but dis-
agree with the item because they think there is enough of it;
they may admire Y, but disagree with because they think it is
the second most important trait; or they may endorse X, but dis-
agree because they can conceive of plausible exceptions. This
applies to MAC-Q items like ‘‘Society should do more to honour
its heroes”, ‘‘Courage in the face of adversity is the most admir-
able trait”, and ‘‘You should always be loyal to your family”, as
well as MFQ items like ‘‘It is more important to be a team player
than to express oneself”, ‘‘Compassion for those who are suffering
is the most crucial virtue”, ‘‘It can never be right to kill a human
being”. Future research should experiment with simpler positive
language, being mindful of the ceiling and floor effects that
‘milder’ items may produce. We also note that the MAC-Q Hero-
ism item ‘‘To be willing to lay down your life for your country is
the height of bravery” introduces a possible confound with Mutu-
alism, and should be avoided in future. In addition, we note that
the Division items focus on the simplest form of fairness: equal-
ity. Future research should aim to explore other more nuanced
expressions of fairness, such as proportionality or merit, which
can lead to unequal outcomes (Starmans, Sheskin, & Bloom,
2017). Lastly, the item selection procedure delivered reversed
Judgement items for Property, and for Property only, which
may have introduced a confound in the valence of the items.
Future work should investigate this, and if necessary correct it.
Generally speaking, future research should aim to replicate the
present findings with alternative sets of items, and indeed with
other types of stimuli (such as standardised vignettes) (Clifford,
Iyengar, Cabeza, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2015).15 For correlations between the MAC-Q and MFQ subscales, see Table S33. For
correlations between the MAC-Q domains and the Big 5 personality traits, see
Table S34 (Rammstedt & John, 2007). And for an initial outline of how cooperative
theory might apply sexual morality, see (Curry et al., 2019: Reply to commentaries).Finally, the present study found that the MAC-Q’s psychomet-
rics performed well, and compare favourably to the MFQ’s, but
there is room for improvement, especially with regard to exter-
nal criterion scales. Future research should aim to identify exter-
nal scales which ask questions more directly related to the
moral valence of the behaviour (rather than, as noted above,
asking whether a person performs that behaviour). Such
research should also extend beyond self-report scales to use per-
formances on tasks, and behavioural measures such as experi-
mental games.
9. Conclusion
Here we have introduced the theory of Morality-as-
Cooperation, and shown how it provides a principled, predictive
and productive approach to the content and structure of morality.
Using cooperation as our compass, we have charted a new course,
and drawn up a more accurate map of the moral landscape –
revealing familiar ground in greater detail, and surveying previ-
ously unexplored territory. Thus equipped, with map and compass,
we look forward to further discoveries ahead.Appendix A
Morality-as-Cooperation Questionnaire: Relevance Items
When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to
what extent are the following considerations relevant to
your thinking? (0–100; not at all relevant, not very relevant,
slightly relevant, somewhat relevant, very relevant, extremely
relevant)
Family
Whether or not someone acted to protect their family.
Whether or not someone helped a member of their family.
Whether or not someone’s action showed love for their
family.
Group
Whether or not someone acted in a way that helped their
community.
Whether or not someone helped a member of their
community.
Whether or not someone worked to unite a community.
Reciprocity
Whether or not someone did what they had agreed to do.
Whether or not someone kept their promise.
Whether or not someone proved that they could be trusted.
Heroism
Whether or not someone acted heroically.
Whether or not someone showed courage in the face of
adversity.
Whether or not someone was brave.
Deference
Whether or not someone deferred to those in authority.
Whether or not someone disobeyed orders.
Whether or not someone showed respect for authority.
Fairness
Whether or not someone kept the best part for themselves.
Whether or not someone showed favouritism.
Whether or not someone took more than others.
Property
Whether or not someone vandalised another person’s
property.
Whether or not someone kept something that didn’t belong
to them.
Whether or not someone’s property was damaged.
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To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
(0–100; strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree,
agree, strongly agree)
Family
People should be willing to do anything to help a member of
their family.
You should always be loyal to your family.
You should always put the interests of your family first.
Group
People have an obligation to help members of their
community.
It’s important for individuals to play an active role in their
communities.
You should try to be a useful member of society.
Reciprocity
You have an obligation to help those who have helped you.
You should always make amends for the things you have
done wrong.
You should always return a favour if you can.
Heroism
Courage in the face of adversity is the most admirable trait.
Society should do more to honour its heroes.
To be willing to lay down your life for your country is the
height of bravery.
Deference
People should always defer to their superiors.
Society would be better if people were more obedient to
authority.
You should respect people who are older than you.
Fairness
Everyone should be treated the same.
Everyone’s rights are equally important.
The current levels of inequality in society are unfair.
Property
It’s acceptable to steal food if you are starving. (R)
It’s ok to keep valuable items that you find, rather than try
to locate the rightful owner. (R)
Sometimes you are entitled to take things you need from
other people. (R)
Note: (R) = reverse coded.Appendix C. Supplementary material
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2018.10.008.
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